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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT AND THE PARADOX OF
AUTHORITY
LESLIE VINJAMURI*
I
INTRODUCTION
The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been one of the
boldest progressive moves in the history of international relations. At the heart
of the Rome Statute is a commitment to the spirit and principle of international
criminal justice. States under the jurisdiction of the ICC agree to cede
sovereignty over individual perpetrators suspected of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes unless they are able and willing to prosecute
perpetrators of these crimes at home. Even heads of state have not been
immune from the formal legal authority of the ICC.
Given the reach of its ambitions, it is unsurprising that the ICC has struggled
to achieve some of its goals. It has, though, become a focal point for a vibrant
and committed network of international advocates, lawyers, and civil society
1
organizations committed to advancing international criminal justice. States also
recognize the ICC’s importance. No fewer than 123 states have ratified the
2
Rome Statute. Among both states and, especially, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), the ICC’s authority is derived from what it is, especially
the principles it embraces and the commitments it espouses.
What the ICC does, though, has elicited mixed reactions. In many instances,
ICC investigations or arrest warrants have provoked a backlash, casting a
shadow over not only the situations it investigates, but also over the Court.
States that remain outside the ICC have protested vehemently when they come
under its jurisdiction. Sudan, for example, has waged an active campaign against
3
the ICC. This took on a new dimension in 2009 when the Chief Prosecutor,
Luis Moreno Ocampo, announced an arrest warrant against the President of
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1. This has been true even in Africa, when states have contested the ICC’s authority. See, e.g.,
Civil Society Rallies Support for Hague Court, ALLAFRICA (Oct. 7, 2013), http://allafrica.com
/view/group/main/main/id/00026803.html.
2. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states
%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx.
3. Plans for this anti-ICC campaign were announced almost immediately after the arrest warrant
for President Bashir was issued. Sudan Plans to Undertake Intensive Campaign Against ICC Decision,
SUDAN TRIBUNE (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article30381.
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Sudan, Omar al-Bashir. Russia and China have rejected the ICC’s authority
from the outset and have continued to protest that the ICC violates national
sovereignty. The fact that both Russia and China are protected from the
purview of the ICC by their power to veto Security Council Resolutions has
failed to mute their critiques of the Court.
The United States has been a strong proponent of international criminal
justice and yet has also refused to become a member of the ICC. Instead, it has
engaged selectively with the ICC, sometimes serving as a staunch supporter and
at other times mounting a vocal challenge to its authority. This challenge took
on a dramatic form when Palestine announced its intention to join the ICC.
The United States attempted to block Palestine’s membership, threatening to
4
cut aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) if it did not abandon this effort. More
remarkable though, is the fact that several member states, each of which has
voluntarily ratified the Rome Statute, have also challenged the ICC’s authority.
After arrest warrants were issued for Kenya’s political elites, Kenya protested
vehemently. Later, the government took its struggle to the African Union. In
September 2013, the African Union held a summit to discuss the possibility of a
5
collective African withdrawal from the ICC. When this failed, they unified to
contest the Court’s authority, voting sitting heads of state in Africa immunity
from the Court’s jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
6
crimes.
Scholars debate the impact of backlash on the authority of the ICC and on
the status of international criminal justice. Some human rights scholars have
argued that backlash is a regular occurrence, even a natural step, in the
7
development and consolidation of new norms. Others argue that the
consequences of a backlash from powerful spoilers can be far more pernicious,
8
especially in contexts where existing institutions are weak. Alter, Helfer, and
Madsen propose an alternative framework for evaluating the ICC. They
compare the formal authority of international courts to their authority in
practice. At a practical level, they suggest that authority may vary significantly
9
across distinct audiences. A court’s “narrow” authority is defined in terms of its

4. Jessica Schulberg, 75 Senators Want to Punish Palestine Before it Can Accuse Israel, NEW
REPUBLIC (Feb. 3, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/120953/senators-threaten-cut-palestinianfunding-over-icc-membership.
5. African Union Summit on ICC Pullout over Ruto Trial, BBC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24173557.
6. African Leaders Vote Themselves Immunity from New Court, THE GUARDIAN, (July 3, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jul/03/african-leaders-vote-immunity-humanrights-court.
7. Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and
Domestic Change, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC
CHANGE (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999).
8. Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of
International Justice, 28 INT’L SECURITY, Winter 2003–04.
9. See Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes the
Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 9.
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authority with respect to those that are directly involved in a particular case.
They find that it is more common for courts to have “narrow authority” than to
have “extensive authority” over a broader set of actors, including international
legal scholars or international civil society. Courts also rely on partners to help
enforce their mandates. These “compliance partners” constitute a court’s
10
“intermediate authority.”
The ICC challenges this finding. Recognition of the ICC’s authority has
been stronger among international NGOs, civil society organizations, and
international human rights lawyers than among actors that are directly
implicated in specific situations and cases. For this transnational network of
justice proponents, ICC authority is intrinsic to what the Court is and is
underpinned first and foremost by a moral, legal, and institutional commitment
to accountability for crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. At the
heart of this commitment is the belief and expectation that international
criminal justice must be independent from politics.
By contrast, material support from states has been contingent on what the
ICC does, rather than what it is. State support has been harder to rally when the
ICC’s investigations impinge on states’ political interests or threaten to impede
peace talks. But the ICC has been hard pressed to secure critical resources and
11
state backing when a state’s leaders or those of its allies come under scrutiny.
The upshot of this is that the ICC faces an “authority paradox.” On the one
hand, its authority among civil society organizations and transnational
advocates is intimately wrapped up in what the ICC is, and especially, in the
assumption that justice must be independent from politics. On the other hand,
the ICC is structurally dependent on states to enforce its mandate, most
especially to help arrest perpetrators of international crimes. This dependence
undercuts the ICC’s flexibility to manage the conflicting interests of its different
12
constituencies. Actions that help secure the support of powerful states
threaten to alienate civil society. NGOs have challenged the ICC for applying
“double standards”; for example, when it targets rebels and fails to
acknowledge state crimes, or, in the case of Security Council referrals, when
powerful states write in clauses that exempt their own nationals from ICC
13
authority.
10. Id. at 10. Karen J. Alter uses the term “compliance partners” in her book on international
courts, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014).
11. For a powerful discussion of the ICC’s tendency to accommodate the interests of powerful
states, see DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A WORLD OF
POWER POLITICS (2014).
12. An extensive literature explores the relationship between politics, law, and the ICC. For a
review of this literature see DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
IN A WORLD OF POWER POLITICS (2014); Leslie Vinjamuri & Jack Snyder, Politics and Law in
Transitional Justice, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 303 (2015).
13. UN Security Council: Address Inconsistency in ICC Referrals: Use Debate on International
Court to Forge a More Principled Relationship, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 16, 2012),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/16/un-security-council-address-inconsistency-icc-referrals. For a
similar argument, see Richard Dicker, The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Double Standards of
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This article proceeds in three parts. First, it reviews the categories of
authority that Alter, Helfer, and Madsen set out to frame their study of
international courts. For these scholars, authority refers to the steps actors take
to acknowledge and support international courts. This article suggests that
politics have shaped the extent of the ICC’s authority among state actors. Next,
it considers implicit claims about the ICC’s authority in contested areas. More
specifically, it evaluates the oft-heard claim that self-referrals by African states
of crimes on their own territory, together with the large number of African
states that have joined the ICC, suggest that the ICC has strong support in
14
Africa. Third, this article suggests that UN Security Council (UNSC) referrals
are not a robust indicator of the ICC’s authority among major powers. State
support of referrals has frequently proved to be an empty gesture with little
subsequent follow-through. Too often, states have provided only minimal
support to ensure the success of investigations, arrests, and trials. Finally, this
article concludes by underscoring the paradox of authority at the heart of the
ICC.
II
AUTHORITY AS A MEASURE OF ICC SUCCESS
How can we make sense of the ICC’s record? International Relations
scholars have suggested several explanations for states’ failure to support
international institutions and norms. Börzel and Risse argue that especially in
areas of limited statehood, states may simply lack the capacity to comply with
15
human rights norms. But the Rome Statute was designed specifically to
overcome this problem. The complementarity principle differentiates states
that are willing and able to hold trials for the perpetrators of mass atrocities
from those that are not, granting the ICC authority over crimes that take place
in those states in this latter category. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui argue that
human rights treaty commitments offer a relatively low-cost mechanism for
16
soliciting positive feedback in the international arena. Support for a referral
may simply be one additional and comparatively cheap step that states can take
to demonstrate their role as good world citizens. If this is the case, it is not
necessarily surprising that states fail to follow through. Regardless of whether
states have good intentions or bad intentions, they enjoy a relatively cost-free
International Justice, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3
(Carsten Stahn ed., 2015). See also Louise Arbour, The Relationship between the ICC and the UN
Security Council, 20 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: REV. OF MULTILATERALISM AND INT’L ORGS.199
(2014).
14. Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, (Feb. 6,
2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/feb/06/africa-attacks-international-criminalcourt/.
15. Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, Human Rights in Areas of Limited Statehood: The New
Agenda, in The Persistent Power of Human Rights 63 (Thomas Risse, Thomas Ropp & Kathryn
Sikkink eds., 2013).
16. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyotero Tsutsui, Justice Lost! The Failure of International
Human Rights Law To Matter Where Needed Most, 44 J. PEACE RES. 407, 413–15 (2007).
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membership in joining and even referring situations to the ICC. Danner and
Simmons have suggested that the decision to join is sincere and may
demonstrate an intention. States join the ICC to tie their hands and make a
17
credible commitment to reducing civil violence. More recent work by Jo and
Simmons argues that states that have ratified the Rome Statute have indeed
18
killed fewer civilians.
Alter, Helfer, and Madsen suggest that authority is critical to explaining
international courts. Authority refers to the steps that actors take to
acknowledge and practically support a court’s work, including its operations,
decisions, and judgments. They identify four types of authority: narrow legal
authority, intermediate authority, extensive legal authority, and popular
19
authority. A court may have robust authority in one category but
comparatively weak authority in another. Narrow authority refers to the
relevant actors in the ICC’s “situations,” primarily rebel actors that are targeted
by indictments or public officials. The intermediate authority of the ICC
extends beyond these parties to include what Alter refers to as its “compliance
partners”: those states and other actors that are critical in providing the ICC
support in gathering information, conducting arrests, or financing its
20
operations. These may include governments that refer a situation to the ICC,
or in the case of Security Council referrals, states with a seat on the Security
Council. The ICC’s extensive legal authority has drawn on a vast network of
civil society activists, legal academics, international NGOs, bar associations, and
other justice entrepreneurs.
While each of these explanations offers some insights into state behavior
before international courts, politics has played a crucial role in shaping the
authority of international courts. In states with limited institutional capacity,
politics has been integral to states’ decisions to support or challenge ICC
investigations. The same has been true in states with consolidated rule of law
institutions that have been called on to support the ICC’s work in third party
states. Politics, especially states’ political interests in peace, security, and
stability, has been a strong driver of states’ choices to recognize or withhold
support from the ICC. When the ICC’s pursuits undermine states’ interests,
states have been quick to defer or evade ICC justice.

17. Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the International Criminal
Court, 64 INT’L ORG. 225, 232 (2010).
18. Hyeran Jo and Beth A. Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity? (Dec.
18, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2552820 (an updated version of this is
forthcoming in International Organization).
19. Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 9, at 9–12.
20. On the idea of compliance partners, see KAREN ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014).
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III
SELF-REFERRALS, AFRICA, AND ICC AUTHORITY
The ICC celebrated its ten-year anniversary in 2012. Scholars and
practitioners have taken an active interest in evaluating the impact of the
21
Court’s activities. At first glance, the ICC appears to have been remarkably
successful. In a little over a decade, it has opened nine situations and has
22
undertaken nearly as many preliminary investigations. At 123 members, a
majority of the world’s states have ratified the Rome Statute, in effect
voluntarily agreeing to delegate authority for prosecution of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes to the ICC, unless a state is willing and able to
prosecute these perpetrators at home.
There are also other signs that the ICC’s authority has increased. The U.S.
stance toward the ICC appears to have softened. Although it initially was a
strong proponent of a permanent international criminal court, the United States
23
later refused to sign or ratify the Rome Statute. The decision to support an
independent prosecutor combined with the failure of the United States to
secure an exemption from ICC justice for its citizens secured its fate as a
nonmember. The U.S. government proceeded to negotiate bilateral immunity
agreements with individual state members of the ICC. These agreements
required states to declare that no American nationals would be turned over to
the ICC. If a state refused to agree to this, then it would forgo military aid from
24
the United States.
The U.S. efforts to restrict the ICC were initially seen as a major hindrance
to its success. Even when the United States supported the ICC, it did so through
a strategy of passive acquiescence rather than active support. When the Security
Council voted to refer Darfur to the ICC, the United States abstained from
25
voting. This effectively enabled the Resolution to pass.
This has been at least partially remedied during the Obama Administration.
Stephen Rapp, Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes in the U.S. Department of
State, led the United States in its more active and constructive approach to the
ICC. This reflected Rapp’s own experience and commitment to international
criminal justice but also a period when the United States sought to engage more
productively with multilateral institutions, prompting David Kaye, a prominent
21. See, for example, the active exchange about the ICC by scholars and activists on Open
Democracy’s
openGlobalRights,
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/internationalcriminal-court; see also Jo & Simmons, supra note 18.
22. See the ICC website for details of ICC investigations and preliminary examinations, available
at All Situations, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations
%20and%20cases/situations/Pages/situations%20index.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2015).
23. David SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS (2011).
24. Judith Kelley, Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International
Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 573, 573–74 ( 2007).
25. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005).
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legal scholar, to declare that the United States and the ICC had entered a
26
“honeymoon” phase.
Despite this appearance of increased authority, the ICC’s record has been
bleak on other dimensions. The United States has more actively supported the
ICC, but it has done so as a seemingly permanent nonmember. The Court has
also struggled to achieve the goals it sets for itself. Of the roughly thirty-six
indictments the ICC has issued publicly, less than one-third of those indicted
have come before the ICC. By autumn of 2015, the ICC had convicted only two
27
individuals. In several cases, most notably Sudan, Libya, and Kenya, states had
28
simply ignored requests to deliver indicted war criminals to The Hague. Some
of the bleakest but least surprising defeats have come from states that have
blatantly rejected the ICC’s authority. After an arrest warrant for President alBashir of Sudan was issued, Sudan became one of the ICC’s most vocal critics.
29
President Bashir openly flouted the ICC arrest warrant against him. Human
rights advocates had hoped that an arrest warrant would marginalize Bashir
30
politically. Instead, Bashir reconsidered his plans to step down and decided to
31
extend his tenure as president.
Despite this complicated record, defenders of the ICC point to the large
number of states that have joined the ICC. In Africa, thirty-four states are
members of the ICC. Even more strikingly, several African states have referred
situations in their own territories to the ICC. Because states are under little
material pressure to join the ICC, and are under even less pressure to refer a
case to the Court, self-referrals are assumed to be a highly significant indicator
of the ICC’s authority. In February 2014, Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of
Human Rights Watch wrote in the New York Review of Books that the very fact
that five of the eight situations under investigation before the ICC had been
referred directly by state parties in Africa was an obvious indicator of the ICC’s
32
support on the continent.

26. David Kaye, America’s Honeymoon with the ICC, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Apr. 16, 2013),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-04-16/americas-honeymoon-icc.
27. Elizabeth Peet, Why is the International Criminal Court so Bad at Prosecuting War Criminals,
WILSON QUARTERLY (June 15, 2015), http://wilsonquarterly.com/stories/why-is-the-internationalcriminal-court-so-bad-at-prosecuting-war-criminals/.
28. In December 2014, the pre-trial chamber of the ICC issued a noncompliance finding. Press
Release, International Criminal Court, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi Case: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I Issues
Non-Compliance Finding for Libyan Government and Refers Matter to UN Security Council, ICC
Press Release, ICC-CPI-20141210-PR1074 (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/
icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/PR1074.aspx.
29. Bashir has repeatedly denounced the ICC, referring to it as a “colonial court.” See, e.g., Sudan
President Bashir hails “Victory” over ICC Charges, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2014), http://www.bbc
.co.uk/news/world-africa-30467167.
30. Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 7,
2009), https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/07/07/selling-justice-short/why-accountability-matters-peace.
31. SARAH M. H. NOUWEN, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE CATALYSING
EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA AND SUDAN (2013).
32. Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Feb. 6,
2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/feb/06/africa-attacks-international-criminal-

VINJAMURI_1-13 (DO NOT DELETE)

282

1/16/2016 11:12 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 79:275

But to what extent are membership and self-referrals indicators of the
authority of the ICC? Self-referrals underscore a state’s recognition of the
ICC’s authority, while also advancing a state’s strategic interests in a specific
conflict situation. Governments in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and Mali have each referred situations in their own territory to the ICC.
In all of these cases, the ICC has investigated rebel crimes rather than state
33
crimes. Despite the motivation for referring a situation to the ICC, arrest
warrants have not necessarily furthered states’ interests and have instead driven
34
rebel groups further underground or across borders.
Referrals and membership bear a complicated relationship to the ICC’s
authority. On the one hand, self-referrals reflect the relevance of the ICC as a
focal point for international criminal justice. In a weak sense, both Security
Council and self-referrals indicate recognition of ICC authority by state
officials. The decisions by Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Central African Republic, and Mali to refer situations in their own territories to
the ICC suggest that these states recognize the ICC’s authority.
By referring itself to the ICC, a state not only recognizes the authority of the
Court; it also cedes control over the scale and content of investigations or trials,
thereby accepting a degree of uncertainty. States take a calculated risk when
they refer situations on their own territory to the ICC. Even if a state’s political
interests in a particular ICC situation change, members forego formal control
over the Court yet remain responsible for supporting its efforts. Ugandan
President Museveni’s decision to refer Uganda to the ICC in 2005 was shaped
by an ongoing conflict between his government and the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA). It may also have reflected a measured risk that the ICC would
35
target the LRA rather than government officials.
In reality, though, state support for the ICC’s investigations and arrest
warrants have continued to depend on politics even after formal referrals are
made. By 2006, President Museveni, anxious to secure the LRA’s cooperation
at peace talks in Juba and fearful that arrest warrants would impede their
success, urged the ICC to drop charges against the LRA. Despite this aboutface and the government’s new interest in ending the war through negotiation,
36
its request fell on deaf ears. The ICC rejected the government’s plea. When
the ICC denied this request, Museveni challenged the ICC’s authority, referring
to it as an imperial tool of the West. These challenges from the government of

court/.
33. Phil Clark, Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in COURTING CONFLICT? PEACE, JUSTICE AND THE ICC IN
AFRICA 42 (Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark eds., 2008).
34. LRA has safe havens in Sudan, Rights Group Says, VOICE OF AMERICA (May 7, 2013),
http://www.voanews.com/content/human-rights-groups-say-lra-safe-havens-are-in-sudan/1656124.html.
35. Clark, supra note 33, at 37-46
36. Miša Zgonec-Rožej, Palestine’s ICC Accession: Risks and Rewards, CHATHAM HOUSE:
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.chathamhouse
.org/expert/comment/16604.

VINJAMURI_1-13 (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2016]

1/16/2016 11:12 AM

THE ICC AND THE PARADOX OF AUTHORITY

283

37

Uganda to the ICC’s authority continue today.
Backlash against the ICC by state parties has been even greater when the
ICC has proceeded without an invitation, suggesting once again that, at least for
states, the ICC’s authority is contingent on what the ICC does, rather than on
what it is. Kenya, a party to the Rome Statute, was no less active in contesting
the ICC’s authority over its elites than nonstate parties have been, adopting an
array of tactics to obstruct the ICC’s attempts to investigate the crimes of its
political elites. Following the election violence in 2007 and 2008, civil society
organizations in Kenya demanded accountability. When domestic elites failed
to put perpetrators of post-election violence on trial, Kofi Annan passed an
envelope containing the names of key perpetrators to the Chief Prosecutor of
38
the ICC, who then opened a formal investigation. But when arrest warrants
were issued against a handful of elite Kenyan politicians, rather than accepting
the ICC’s authority, (then) Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and (then)
Minister of Education William Ruto combined forces and launched a campaign
to bolster their domestic political power and delegitimize the ICC’s authority.
Kenyatta and Ruto formed an unlikely political coalition, the Jubilee alliance,
combining forces to mobilize against the ICC and launching a bid for the
presidency. Their political campaign framed the ICC as an instrument of
Western imperialism. Kenyatta then used his newly won platform as President
39
to mobilize the African Union against the ICC. Kenyatta’s success has created
a climate in which ICC enthusiasts in Kenya have found it increasingly difficult
40
to mobilize domestic support for the Court.
IV
GREAT POWERS AND THE POLITICS OF ICC AUTHORITY
Politics have also shaped the propensity of major powers to acknowledge
and support the ICC. In Libya, this initially meant something very different
than it did for Syria. In 2011, there was widespread support for targeted
sanctions against Libya’s officials and also for referring it to the ICC. Security

37. Uganda’s President Museveni Calls for Africa to Review its Ties with ICC, DAILY NATION
(Oct.
9,
2015),
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Africa-should-review-ties-with-ICC--Museveni//1056/2480492/-/138otwdz/-/index.html.
38. ICC Press Release, CC - ICC Prosecutor receives Sealed Envelope from Kofi Annan on PostElection Violence in Kenya (July 9, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations
%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200109/press%20releases/Pages/pr436.aspx.
39. Kenya Commits $1mn to ‘Unstoppable’ African Court of Justice, CAPITAL NEWS (Jan. 31,
2015), http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2015/01/kenya-commits-1mn-to-unstoppable-african-court-ofjustice/.
40. Is the International Criminal Court a Tool of Western Imperialism? No., CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2013/1015/Is-theInternational-Criminal-Court-a-tool-of-Western-imperialism-No; Walter Menya, State Targeting Us
Over Support for Hague Cases, Civil Society Protests, DAILY NATION (Oct. 25, 2014),
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Civil-Society-ICC-Hague-Cases-Jubilee-Government//1064/2499628/-/kylkb4z/-/index.html.
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41

Council Resolution 1970 passed easily. A second Security Council Resolution
authorized all necessary means to halt Qaddafi’s imminent attack on Benghazi.
ICC Chief Prosecutor Ocampo moved swiftly to issue an arrest warrant against
Colonel Qaddafi. The arrest warrant was issued independently from NATO’s
military campaign but was broadly compatible with the strategic objectives of
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. As the intervention
continued, though, and NATO’s intervention appeared to many to move
beyond one of protecting civilians and toward a strategy of regime change,
support for the intervention dissipated and fractures occurred among members
of the Security Council. South Africa’s preferences also quickly diverged from
NATO’s. Under the auspices of the African Union, President Zuma of South
42
Africa attempted to negotiate an end to the war with Libya’s leader, Qaddaffi.
The African Union rejected the ICC’s arrest warrant against Qaddafi and
sought a negotiated solution.
If things moved quickly in Libya, they moved very slowly in Syria. The
United States was slow to support European efforts to raise the profile of
accountability for Assad’s crimes in Syria. For nearly a year, it resisted calls to
sign a letter as part of a European-led initiative to press the Security Council to
43
refer Syria to the ICC. Within a year, though, the U.S. position had changed.
This policy change reflected the new facts on the ground in Syria. Failed peace
negotiations at the Geneva II peace talks cast a shadow over the United States
44
aspiration for a negotiated settlement. Photos amassed by a Syrian military
police photographer who defected, known only as Caesar, were presented to
45
Security Council members. The United States, under the leadership of
Ambassador-at-large Rapp, joined a tidal wave of support from other states and
46
signed off on Security Council Resolution 1970, referring Libya to the ICC.
41. Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Libyan Authorities in Bid to Stem Violent Repression,
UN NEWS CENTRE (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37633&Cr=
Libya&Cr1=#.VkTHdHv1-KI.
42. Priscilla Hayner, Libya: The ICC Enters During War, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS: INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES PROJECT (2013),
http://www.ecfr.eu/ijp/case/libya.
43. Switzerland and 57 Countries Call on Security Council to Refer Syria to ICC, UN REPORT
(Jan. 11, 2013), http://un-report.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/switzerland-52-countries-call-on.html.
44. In mid-February 2014, the Geneva II peace talks ended with no solution to the war in Syria.
See Anne Barnard & Nick Cumming-Bruce, After Second Round of Syria Talks, No Agreement Even
on How to Negotiate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/world/
middleeast/after-second-round-of-syria-talks-no-agreement-even-on-how-to-negotiate.html.
The
United States decided to support a referral of Syria to the ICC in May 2014. Colum Lynch, Exclusive:
US to Support ICC War Crimes Prosecution in Syria, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 7, 2014),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/07/exclusive-u-s-to-support-icc-war-crimes-prosecution-in-syria/.
45. Syria Crisis: 'Torture' Photos Shown to UN Security Council, BBC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27044203.
46. United Nations, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, In Swift, Decisive Action, Security
Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of
Crackdown on Protesters, U.N. Press Release SC/10187/Rev.1 (Feb. 26, 2011),
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The Resolution was vetoed by China and Russia and thus failed to pass.
Despite this apparent failure, within months, the U.S. backing of efforts to
investigate atrocities in Syria had changed. The dramatic rise of a strategic
threat from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria led the U.S. government to
recalibrate its strong statements against the government of Syria and to pursue
a more tentative line. Funding for investigations of Assad’s crimes came to an
end and was not renewed. Instead, the United States decided to fund an
48
investigation of Islamic State crimes.
In some cases, politics have created an opportunity for human rights
advocates to push accountability forward. Following the breakdown of nuclear
talks on North Korea, a bipartisan consensus emerged in the United States to
support human rights accountability for North Korea. In February 2014, a
Commission of Inquiry that had been set up to investigate human rights abuses
in North Korea released its report. After successful mobilization by a coalition
of advocates working in partnership with Michael Kirby, who spearheaded the
report, the United States voted to support a UN General Assembly resolution
condemning North Korea for its human rights abuses. The GA Resolution
49
requested that the Security Council refer it to the ICC. This vote was made
possible in the United States by the political reality that movement on nuclear
talks on the Korean Peninsula had been stalled for some time. This created the
space for bipartisan consensus on placing North Korea under pressure for its
appalling human rights record.
In some cases, membership in the ICC has become a source of contestation.
In January 2015, following a decision by the UN General Assembly to grant
Palestine nonstate observer status, the ICC indicated that it would accept a
request by Palestine for ICC membership. It then confirmed a request under
Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute to open a preliminary examination dating
50
back to June 2014. The United States and Israel protested vigorously, naming
51
and shaming the PA and challenging the decision by the ICC. The United
syria-gives-hope-but-sceptics-right-to-be-wary-26503.
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China Block ICC Referral, HUMAN. RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/
2014/05/22/un-security-council-vetoes-betray-syrian-victims; United Nations Meetings Coverage and
Press Releases, Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails as Negative Votes Prevent
Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution (May 22 2014), http://www.un.org/press
/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm.
48. Colum Lynch, Exclusive: Washington Cuts Funds for Investigating Bashar al-Assad’s War
Crimes, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 3, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/03/exclusive-washington-cutsfunds-for-investigating-bashar-al-assads-war-crimes/.
49. UN Assembly Votes to Refer North Korea to IC: UNGA Also Urges Security Council to
Consider sanctions Against Pyongyang Over Alleged Crimes Against Humanity, ALJAZEERA (Dec. 19
2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2014/12/un-north-korea-icc-human-rights2014121823436300711.html.
50. See Palestine, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/
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States argued that the situation in Israel and Palestine should be resolved
through careful negotiation. Instead, the move to join the ICC represented an
“escalation” on the part of the PA, it claimed. Israel threatened to withhold
valuable tax revenues from the PA.
Even where states have succeeded in crossing the referral barrier, this has
often marked the end rather than the beginning of support for the ICC. Once
the Security Council referred Sudan and Libya to the ICC, the Security
Council’s five permanent members (the P5), did little to ensure the success of
these efforts. The overthrow of the Qaddafi regime brought an end to concerted
52
U.S. and NATO engagement in Libya.
V
THE PARADOX OF AUTHORITY
In his book, Rough Justice, Bosco argues that the ICC has accommodated
53
powerful Western states, and especially the United States.
This
accommodation tendency threatens to undermine the ICC’s authority among
many of its most steadfast proponents. The ICC’s proximity to state power, and
especially to the Security Council, is directly at odds with those among its
constituents who value the neutrality and impartiality of international justice
norms in theory as well as in practice. The challenge of balancing power and
independence was most palpable in the aftermath of NATO’s war in Libya,
where the proximity between the Security Council, state interests, and
international criminal justice seemed uncomfortably close for many of the ICC’s
proponents. Allegations that the ICC had become too closely associated with a
Western policy of regime change quickly surfaced. In February 2011, the
Security Council referred Libya to the ICC. Within days, then Chief Prosecutor
Luis Ocampo opened a formal investigation and by June, Ocampo issued an
arrest warrant for the leader of Libya, Qaddafi, his son Saif, and the intelligence
54
minister, Al-Senussi.
The speed with which the ICC moved in Libya
intensified perceptions that power and justice were too closely aligned.
In the aftermath of NATO’s intervention in Libya, ardent supporters of the
ICC openly questioned and even challenged the role of the Security Council in
referring cases to the ICC. Louise Arbour, one of the most prominent
POL’Y, (Dec. 31, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/31/israel-u-s-slam-palestinian-bid-to-joininternational-criminal-court/.
52. BOSCO, supra note 11; Arbour, supra note 13, at 200–01; Louise Arbour, President & CEO,
Int’l Crisis Group, Address at the Inaugural Roland Berger Lecture on Human Rights and Human
Dignity: Are Freedom, Peace and Justice incompatible agendas? (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.crisisgroup
.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2014/arbour-are-freedom-peace-and-justice-incompatibleagendas.aspx; Louise Arbour, President & CEO, International Crisis Group, Opening Speech at the
Global Briefing 2013: Doctrines Derailed?: Internationalism’s Uncertain Future (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2013/arbour-doctrines-derailedinternationalism-s-uncertain-future.aspx [hereinafter Doctrines Derailed].
53. BOSCO, supra note 11, at 11–22 .
54. Libya: Muammar Gaddafi Subject to ICC Arrest Warrant, BBC NEWS (June 27,
2011),http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13927208.
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supporters of international justice, argued that international justice and
55
international politics must be kept on “separate tracks.” In Mali also, events
gave the impression, possibly unfairly, that the ICC had failed to keep a healthy
distance from policies of western military intervention. The government of Mali
referred itself to the ICC in 2012. In January, France intervened with military
force. Five days later, the ICC announced its decision to open a situation in
56
Mali.
In the aftermath of Libya, Russia, and China have also become more
57
assertive in their critiques of the ICC. Each of these powers vetoed the
58
Resolution calling for Syria to be referred to the ICC. When North Korea
came before the General Assembly for its record of human rights abuses,
59
Russia and China once again voiced their opposition to an ICC referral.
The ICC’s authority paradox may not be unique. Many international
institutions recognize the realities of power by granting special privileges to a
small number of powerful states. This creates an obvious tension with a
sovereignty norm that prescribes equal status to all states. It is also not unusual
for this in-built hypocrisy to create tensions in civil society. In the domain of
international criminal justice, civil society has embraced pragmatic
compromises. The ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugsolavia and Rwanda
were products of Security Council Resolutions that directly linked justice to
peace and security. This proximity between the Security Council and
international justice was secured in Rome when it was agreed that the Security
Council could not only refer cases to the ICC, but also defer them. Still, ICC
authority depends crucially on the pretense, supported by practice, that justice
will remain free from political interference.
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